Using novel data on CEO time use, we document the relationship between the size and composition of the executive team and the attention of the CEO. We combine information about CEO span of control for a sample of 65 companies with detailed data on how CEOs allocate their time, which we define as their span of attention. CEOs with larger executive teams do not save time for personal use, or to cultivate external constituencies. Instead, CEOs with broader spans of control invest more in a "team" model of interaction. They spend more time internally, specifically in pre-planned meetings that have more participants from different functions. The complementarity between span of control and the team model of interaction is more prevalent in larger firms.
I. Introduction
"…managers devote much more time and energy to the problems of managing their coalition than they do to the problems of dealing with the outside world." Cyert and March (1963; p. 205-6) At least since Fayol (1918) the notion of span of control has occupied a central position in management, both in scholarly analysis and practical implementation. Span of control plays an important role in organizations and has implications for organizational structure, how decisions are made, the interactions between supervisors and subordinates and is an important aspect of a manager's coalition. Early studies on span of control seek to determine how many subordinates a manager can supervise (e.g., Simon, 1945 , Urwick, 1956 , and Woodward, 1965 .
While these articles were written more than fifty years ago, the notion of span of control remains relevant for organizations today. For instance, the Boston Consulting Group has a federal trademark for the term "delayering" for its distinctive approach to flattening the corporate pyramid which involves the broadening of spans of control for managers at all levels.
Traditionally, span of control is defined and measured as the number of direct subordinates a manager supervises. Since all managers "manage" at least one subordinate, span of control applies to managers at all levels throughout the organization. In this paper, we focus on the top of the organization-the span of control of the Chief Executive Officer (CEO). This is arguably the most critical locus of decision making for organizations, since the CEO and his direct subordinates are the senior executives that comprise the top management team and corporate headquarters -i.e., the governing body that is responsible for setting strategy and allocating resources (Mintzberg, 1979) . Moreover, top team structure is a reflection of the underlying organizational structure of the firm (e.g., Chandler, 1962; Beckman and Burton, 2011; 3 Li, Guadalupe, Wulf, 2013) . Importantly, there is a large body of research in management that documents relationships between characteristics of the top management team (TMT) and firm performance. 1 This paper uses novel data to better understand the role of the CEO and the relationship to his executive team as represented by the CEO's span of control. We collect detailed time use information for a large sample of CEOs and use it to characterize how CEOs allocate their time.
We document how this new and comprehensive measure -span of attention -is related to span of control, and in doing so, shed light on the relationship between formal and informal structure.
We ask two questions: What is the relationship between the size of the executive team and CEO attention? Does this relationship vary by team composition and firm characteristics?
While previous work used time-use analysis to describe patterns of behavior of top executives, the sample size was always limited. To the best of our knowledge, the largest observational dataset on top executives is Kotter (1999) , which includes 15 general managers, who were selected for being successful and is based on data from the late 1970s. Bandiera, Guiso, Prat, and Sadun (2011) collected time-use information on a sample of 94 CEOs of top-600 Italian firms, but lacked detailed organizational chart information. Rajan and Wulf (2006) document dramatic increases in CEO span of control over the past two decades in a sample of 300+ large US firms, and Guadalupe, Li and Wulf (2013) document a shift in the composition of the top management team toward functional managers (CFO, CHRO, General Counsel). However, the data used for these latter two studies lacked information on CEO attention. 1 Much of the TMT literature focuses on the characteristics of the individual manager (e.g., tenure, education, experience) and evaluates group diversity (see Finkelstein, Hambrick and Canella, 2009 , Chapter 5, for a survey). Instead, we focus on the structure of the top management team --both the size and composition of the executive team --as represented by CEO span of control. For recent empirical papers on the size and structure of the executive team, refer to Guadalupe, Li and Wulf (2013), Wulf (2012) , and Neilson and Wulf (2012) . 4 The idea that the use of time can be informative about CEOs' allocation patterns, and hence their role within the firm, resonates with a number of distinct literatures. One of Drucker's (1966) The paper is structured as follows. In section II, we present the methodology used to collect the time use data, and basic summary statistics on the firms and executives in our sample.
We describe related literature in section III and the main findings of our analysis in section IV.
Finally, in section V, we discuss our findings and conclude.
II. Data and Methods
The key contribution of this paper consists of studying detailed records of CEO time use and the relationship with CEO span of control and the positions comprising the executive team.
This section briefly describes our data collection methodology, the characteristics of the CEOs and firms represented in our sample, and the basic summary statistics of the time use and organizational data underlying our analysis. The time use survey allows us to effectively shadow the CEO -directly or through a Personal Assistant (PA) -for every day over a one week period. The participant is asked to record real-time information on all activities that last 15 minutes or longer in a time use diary.
II.a. Survey Methodology
For each activity -defined as a task to which the CEO devotes time in excess of 15 minutes -the diary records information on the type of activity (e.g. meetings, phone calls, etc.), its duration, its location, whether it was scheduled in advance and when, and whether it is held regularly and how often. Crucially for our analysis, the diary also collects information on the number of participants in meetings, whether they are employees of the firm or not, and if insiders, their occupational areas (e.g. finance, marketing); if outsiders, their relation to the firm (e.g. investors, suppliers). The survey also asks to record the total time the CEO spends in activities that last 15 9 minutes or less or in travel. Hence, by summing the time spent over activities in excess of 15 minutes and the time spent in activities that last less than 15 minutes we obtain a measure of the CEO total working time.
Within the same survey, we also collected in depth information on the formal organizational structure of the firm, namely the number of positions reporting directly to the CEO and types of positions. Or, put another way, the size and composition of the executive team.
This setting allows us to look directly at the allocation of CEO time, and its relationship with organizational measures of span of control, both in terms of its breadth and composition.
Participants to the survey were drawn from a population of 349 CEOs set to take part in an executive education course at the Harvard Business School in January 2010. 4 Prior to the program, each participant received an email invitation from the leaders of the executive education program, providing a link to a password protected website which allowed participants to fill in their time diaries online. In order to avoid endogenous week selection, we imposed the constraint that all participants had to complete the survey in a pre-selected week in November before they arrived at HBS for the executive course. Finally, to improve the response rate, we communicated that the time use analysis would be discussed in a dedicated session during the executive course, and that participants would be offered an individualized time use analysis of their own activity data.
Out of the initial population of 349 individuals, 107 responded positively to the invitation. Table A1 in the Appendix looks at the differences between participants and non-participants. We find that firms led by participating CEOs tend to be smaller in terms of both employment and sales compared to the rest of potential participants, but the differences are not significant in statistical terms. We also find firms led by participating CEOs ted to be marginally more productive (in terms of labor productivity) compared to non participants, and the difference is significant at the 10% level.
Of the 107 participants, 42 observations had to be dropped as the records were incomplete (i.e. less than 4 days were recorded), inaccurate (i.e. the activities description was incomplete), or the respondent was not a CEO. The estimating sample thus consists of 65 CEOs observed for at least 4 complete days. While the data was effectively self-reported, we hired a project manager who could help the respondents in case of doubts or questions regarding the specific fields they had to fill in, and to make sure that respondents filled in their time diaries on a daily basis to improve the accuracy of the data. In 88% of the cases, the survey data was filled in by the CEO's personal assistant, and in the rest of the cases the survey was filled directly by the CEO. Finally, we complemented the time use data with information from manual searches and accounting databases to obtain additional firm level characteristics such as main industry of activity, employment and listed status.
II.b. Descriptive Statistics: Firm Characteristics, Span of Control, and CEO Time Use
The analysis is based on data aggregated at the week level. Table 1 provides some basic information on the firms and CEOs in our sample. The firms are relatively small (200 employees at the median), however, the dataset also includes some very large corporations and the average number of employees is 2116. This wide heterogeneity in firm size reflects the differences among participants of the executive education course from which we draw our sample. We have a good representation of firms that are widely held (29% listed) and 20% of our firms operate in 11 the manufacturing sector. Finally, although the majority of firms in our sample are located in North America, we also have quite a few European (15%) and Asian organizations (14%).
Panel B, Table 1 shows that, in our sample, the average CEO tenure in the role of CEO is 11 years (median of 9). On average, 34% of the CEOs report to be older than 45 years of age and almost half of the CEOs have a college degree (45%). Turning to the organizational variables (Panel C, Table 1 The averages of the organizational variables in our sample are surprisingly similar to those reported by other samples of large US firms. For example, Rajan and Wulf (2006) , looking at a sample of large, publicly-traded US firms (average employees of approximately 50,000), find -similarly to our data -that the number of positions reporting to the CEO was 6.79 in 1998 (standard deviation 3.90), and 45% of the sample reported to have a COO.
Place Table 1 
about here
The key innovation of our data is that it allows us to directly link information on organizational structure with data on the time allocation of CEOs. 6 It is important to note, work-related activities that the CEO may perform in the evenings or on weekends, and we miss the characteristics of those that take less than 15 minutes. 7 Finally, while we have data on which positions make up the top management team and on the specific types of functions (e.g. finance,
HR, etc) interacting with the CEO, our data does not allow us to identify with precision whether direct reports vs. other subordinates lower in the hierarchy attend meetings with the CEO. While we acknowledge that direct reports might not attend all meetings in which the CEO interacts with other employees of the firm, given the relatively small size of the firms in our sample, we believe that it would be unlikely not to have direct reports present in most CEO interactions.
Instead, our data are rich in information on the allocation of the CEO's attention -including the 6 Our data addresses some of the measurement issues related to various measures of span of control discussed by Ouchi and Dowling, 2004 and may explain the mixed empirical findings with respect to the determinants of span of control (see Puranum, et al, 2012). 7 While our data provides a very detailed account of a portion of the activities undertaken by the CEO, it does not allow us to measure with precision the totality of the activities, thus leading to potential underestimation of total working hours, including short activities, long but informal work activities (e.g. informal business conversation might not be reported in our data), or personal time taken during working hours. To look into this issue, we built a measure of the fraction of time that CEOs report to happen within working hours (i.e. from the moment the working day is reported to begin until its end), but for which we do not have detailed information in terms of participants, planning horizon, etc., and we investigated whether this fraction was systematically correlated with observable firms and CEO characteristics. The results of this analysis are provided in Table A2 . We could not find any systematic relationship between the share of time with no activity details and firm employment, span of control, and the dummies capturing the composition of the top management team. The only variable that appears to be significant is a dummy capturing firms active in manufacturing: these CEO tend to spend about 12% more time in unaccounted activities relative to CEOs of other industries. We make sure to control for sectoral differences across all regressions.
13 length of meetings, whether the activity was planned or unplanned, and the number and types of participants present in the meetings -which we exploit extensively in our analysis.
Before looking at the relationship between time use and organizational structure, it is useful to start our analysis by providing some basic information on the overall patterns of time allocation reported by the CEOs in our sample. Standard models of organizational structure are typically built on the assumption that the interactions between the CEO and his subordinates are largely homogenous and bilateral. The time use data, however, reveals a much greater degree of richness in the variety of interactions.
In other words, CEOs differ significantly not only in the total amount of time they spend with insiders, but also in how they decide to organize this time, i.e. as one-to-one vs. multilateral, single vs. cross-functional, and planned vs. unplanned meetings.
In our data, about half of the share of time dedicated to insiders is planned in advance (51% of all insider interactions). Interactions with insiders frequently involve more than two participants (47% of share of time spent with insiders), and almost 25% of the meetings with 14 insiders are cross-functional. Crucially, a wide heterogeneity exists in all these dimensions of time use.
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In Table 3 we show the pairwise correlations between the total number of hours worked and the allocation of time across the different activities shown in Table 2 and business unit managers. We investigate these patterns in more detail in section IV.
Place Table 3 about here
III. CEO Span of Control and Attention

III.a. Related Literature
A natural question about executive attention is whether the presence of a large executive team (broad span of control) provides the CEO with more or less time to attend to other constituencies. Broadly speaking, the CEO can devote his time to interaction with firm insiders (any employee, including the executive team), to individual work, to interaction with outside constituencies (clients, investors, etc.) or to personal time. In this section, we discuss whether 15 and how the number and the type of positions that report directly to the CEO might be related to CEO attention. In particular, we focus on several issues discussed in the literature.
First, the allocation of CEO time between two major activities --spending time alone vs.
interacting with other people --is central to the existing studies of executive time use (Mintzberg, 1973 , Kotter, 1999 , and more recently by Porter and Nohria, 2010). Time spent alone might be dedicated to analysis, planning, and strategic thinking, or it could be a measure of organizational slack, which is an optimal response when projects requiring attention are unpredictable (Iliev and However, a counter argument is that the increase in the number of direct reports (size of the executive team) is associated with greater CEO involvement in different functions of the organization and more centralized decision-making. 8 Based on data from both large sample studies and extensive CEO interviews in large US firms, Wulf (2012) argues that delayering at the top of the pyramid and the corresponding increase in CEO span of control and changed structure of the executive team is a complex phenomenon that in the end may be more indicative of centralized decision-making and greater coordination among the executive team. 9 Regardless, empirical evidence on the relationship between broader span and delegation is remarkably thin.
Third, the composition of the executive team, in addition to its size (span of control), is an important factor in the role of the CEO and, potentially, in the allocation of attention. 
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(i.e., M-form organization). They document that these changes in the executive team are correlated with changes in key strategic variables, such as the degree of diversification and investments in information technology. Based on analysis of compensation, they find that functional managers appear to be assuming some responsibility for general managers (a phenomenon they term "functional centralization"). However, their findings say nothing about whether the CEO is more or less involved with subordinates. 
III.b. Types of CEO Interaction : Complements vs. Substitutes
Based on the discussion above, we return to the question of whether the presence of a In what follows we examine these two views of the relationship between CEO attention and executive team from three angles. We first look for the presence of positive or negative complementarities between CEO time use and executive team size. We then see how the presence of a certain type of agent in the team, the COO, affects complementarities. Finally, we explore how the characteristics of the firm, in particular firm size, affect our findings.
Our analysis is purely descriptive, i.e. we do not in any way claim that the structure of the executive team considered in our analysis should cause specific patterns of time allocation. 
IV. Results
IV.a. CEO Time Use and Team Size/ Composition
In this section, we first look for the presence of positive or negative complementarities between CEO time use and executive team size. We then see how the presence of a certain type of agent in the team, the COO, affects complementarities. We show the results of these analyses in Tables 4 and 5 .
We start by looking at the relationship between time use and the number of positions reporting directly to the CEO, i.e., his span of control or the size of the executive team. In Table   4 , we present two specifications for each dependent variable: odd columns include only the main variable of interest, while even columns include all additional control variables (firm and CEO characteristics). 
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Place Table 4 about here Next, we exploit our time-use measures to study the extent to which organizational variables correlate with different types of CEO interactions with firm employees. This is interesting because heterogeneity in the size, planning horizon, and the participants involved in the meetings can capture salient differences in CEO styles, that are largely ignored in standard organizational models. Of equal importance, the types of interactions between the CEO and firm employees are informative about the extent to which the CEO directs his attention to activities that foster behavioral integration within the executive team, as discussed earlier in Section III.
In Table 5 , we explore further the relationship between CEO internal time use and the size and composition of the CEO's executive team. To do this, we do two things. First, we break down the interactions with insiders (columns 1 and 2) according to the planning horizon 13 Earlier work on managerial time allocation has investigated extensively whether the time spent with insiders may be seen as involuntary "interruptions" of the CEO workday, rather than voluntary interactions (e.g., Perlow (1997) and Sesjadri and Shapira (2001) ). Unfortunately in this data we are not able to distinguish between activities initiated by the CEO vs. external interruptions.
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(columns 3 and 4), the number of participants involved (columns 5 and 6), and their crossfunctional nature (columns 7 and 8). Second, we evaluate the association between CEO internal time use and the composition of the executive team: specifically, whether the executive team includes a COO, functional managers, and/or business unit managers (columns 2, 4, 6, and 8).
In all columns in Table 5 except the last, we find a positive and statistically significant coefficient on the number of direct reports. CEOs with larger teams spend more time internally, and they spend more time in meetings of a certain type: planned in advance (columns 3 and 4), with more participants (columns 5 and 6), and that are cross-functional in nature (columns 7 and 8). The magnitudes of the coefficient indicate that a doubling in the CEO span of control is associated with increases of about 10% in planned and multifunctional meetings with insiders.
Next, we turn to the composition of the executive team. In the even columns in Table 5, we include a dummy taking value one if a COO exists and reports directly to the CEO. This To analyze whether CEO attention varies with the underlying organizational structure, we include dummy variables that proxy for whether the firm is a functional or multidivisional 22 organization (Table 5 , even columns). Specifically, one dummy captures the presence of functional managers in the executive team (e.g., CFO, CHRO, etc) and another captures the presence of business unit managers. The organizational structure does not appear to correlate with CEO attention. However, our measures of organizational structure are somewhat coarse.
Finally, it is important to note that the complementarity between team size and CEO attention is robust and relatively stable across specifications and is not driven by the composition of the executive team.
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In summary, the results shown in Tables 4 and 5 Second, we find that CEOs with larger teams, in addition to spending more time internally, tend to have more multilateral, planned, and cross-functional interactions. This suggests that CEOs with larger teams (or more direct subordinates) invest more in behavioral integration to maintain the collaborative role of the executive team (i.e., the team model of interaction). As predicted by the TMT literature, larger teams face greater cognitive heterogeneity, less social integration, and are less likely to achieve consensus in decision-making.
One important role for the CEO with more subordinates is to allocate attention internally to "achieve mutual and collective interaction and share information, resources and decisions across team members" (Hambrick, 2007, pg 
IV.b. Types of CEO Interaction and Firm Characteristics
The Table 6 , motivated by TMT predictions as discussed earlier we investigate whether the relationship between team size and internal CEO attention varies by the size of the firm. We repeat specifications from Table 5 (i.e., the even columns with all control variables), but split the sample into small and large firms.
The odd columns in Table 6 Turning to the composition of the team, we find a negative coefficient on the COO dummy in both large and small firms that is statistically significant in all but two specifications.
CEOs appear to use COOs as delegates regardless of firm size. Lastly, we find some evidence suggesting a negative relationship between CEO attention and the presence of functional managers, but only in small firms. This is consistent with the idea that functional managers may serve as CEO delegates in small firms.
Place Table 6 about here 15 In Table A3 we investigate whether large and small firms differ in terms of their CEO use of time and other observable firm characteristics. We find that the two types of firms are similar along most dimensions, with the exception that the CEOs tend to have a narrower span of control (7 vs 5 direct reports on average), that they tend to be more likely to have a functional managers reporting directly to them, and that they are more prevalent in Asia.
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Taken together, the patterns we observe are consistent with the prediction by Hambrick et al that achieving behavioral integration is harder in larger teams, especially in large organizations.
In equilibrium, CEOs of larger organizations must put more effort into maintaining cohesion in the executive team. Thus, an increase in team size results in a larger increase in time devoted to the team in larger organizations as opposed to small organizations.
V. Discussion and Conclusion
This paper uses novel data to better understand the role of the CEO and the relationship to the executive team as represented by the CEO's span of control. We collect detailed time use information for a large sample of CEOs and use it to characterize how CEOs allocate their time.
We compare how this new and more comprehensive measure -span of attention -is related to the more traditional notion of span of control.
Overall, our findings suggest that the structure of the executive team -both the size and Although our study presents several limitations, which we discuss in the paper, we believe that a more systematic study of managerial attention over a large sample of executives could bring significant benefits to scholars in both management and economics. First, looking at interactions in conjunction with organizational structure may provide the basis for more realistic formal models of organizations. More generally, time use analysis allows scholars to shift from the focus on individual managers to analyzing teams and complementarities inherent in human capital. At the same time, this study also suggests the importance of refining definitions and sharpening the empirical predictions of top management team models prevalent in the 27 management literature. For example, our findings suggest that it would be beneficial to move beyond the use of simple demographic information of top team members, and consider in more detail the structural aspects of the executive team.
Practitioners may also benefit from time use data for several reasons. First, basic calendar analysis can be used as a tool for assessment for individual managers to evaluate their own patterns of time allocation. In the debrief with the participants of the executive education program at Harvard Business School, for example, we found that the executives' assessment of how they spend their time was quite different from actual records. Executives also find it fascinating to compare their time allocation to that of other peers in the same industry, as a way to gauge differences in their respective managerial styles. Finally, time use analysis enables senior managers to evaluate whether they are allocating time in a manner that is consistent with firm strategy and priorities critical to the implementation of strategy.
Ultimately, we argue that it is critical to complement traditional notions of organizational structure and team characteristics -span of control -with rich data on CEO interactions -span of attention. Although the collection of time use data for large sample of individuals presents clear methodological challenges, our experience across several countries and the availability of electronic calendars convince us of the feasibility of this research agenda. Most importantly, we believe that this strand of research could facilitate the establishment of a much-needed connection between the formal models of organizational structure in economics and the richness of the theories and empirical findings of the management literature.
Obviously, this paper is just an initial step in this direction, and there are many ways in which the time use data can be improved, suggesting several directions for future research. First, by collecting information on the purpose of the meetings, we could distinguish between 28 interactions that primarily facilitate information exchange versus interactions that involve decision-making and the relationship between objectives and top team structure. Second, by collecting data on the firm's strategy and scope of businesses, we could explore how interactions and team structure relate to the interdependence of tasks. 16 For example, the role of the CEO might be very different in firms that operate in related businesses versus diversified firms, and we could characterize the CEO's role by the nature of interactions and relate it to team structure.
Also, it would be interesting to analyze smaller groups of teams using our span of attention measure since all team members are not involved in every decision. 17 Lastly, span of control complemented by span of attention will allow us to explore the relationship between organizational structure, management interactions, firm strategy and performance. We leave these topics for further research. 16 Barrick, Bradley and Colbert, 2007 emphasize how the importance of interdependencies (e.g., relatedness of businesses) will determine the importance of interactions (and team-based behavior) and the effect on firm performance. Firms should consider firm and industry characteristics when thinking about the optimal level of TMT interactions. 17 Jackson (1992) discusses how top management teams are typically assigned to task forces comprised of smaller teams that focus on specific issues, initiatives, and decisions. Relatedly, Friesch (2011) argues that CEOs rely on a few key executives in top teams that are deeply involved in key decisions.
